

## UNLOCKING THE OUTER WORLD

The same function which gives unity to the various ideas (*Vorstellungen*) in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various ideas in an intuition (*Anschauung*) ... (Kant, 1781/1789: A79-80/B105-106)

What distinguishes my conception of logic is first of all recognisable by the fact that I place the content of the word 'true' to the fore, and then by the fact that I immediately proceed to *thoughts* as the things by which truth can come into question at all. Thus I do not begin from concepts, and build up thoughts, or judgements, out of these, but I obtain parts of thoughts by decomposing thoughts. (Frege, 1919: 273)

In advancing his view of judgement, Frege also advanced a view of perception and of experience more widely. In both instances, he advanced our understanding. The advance begins to show itself in the contrast between Frege and Kant above. Kant draws a parallel between one supposed task to be performed—forming the unity of a judgement out of 'the ideas' of which it is formed—and another—forming a particular sort of unity out of those elements which form an 'Anschauung'—for example, a visual experience, or experiencing. If we follow Frege, the comparison breaks down before it starts. For there is no such things as unifying elements into a judgement; no such work to be done. Thoughts, judgements, are not built out of building blocks which somehow require something else to hold them together. Rather, the existence of their elements—such things as concepts, or as he later put things, their counterparts in the realm of *Sinn*—presupposes whole thoughts, only by decomposition which are concepts (or etc.) arrived at. Nor, as he further expands his view of judgements, is the sort of awareness we enjoy, e.g., in seeing the things around us, that in which capacities of *thought* have a role to play. I take none of this to be either self-explanatory or apodictic. In what follows I will try to explain what Frege's advance is, and why it is an advance. My story will touch on Kant, and, considerably, on John McDowell, the most astute wielder of Kant's slogan above (henceforth The Slogan).

Frege's advance is in answering what I will call the fundamental question of perception: How does perception make the world bear (rationally) for the perceiver on what he is to think and do? How does it thus open up the world to his view? How, e.g., could seeing a pig snuffling beneath that oak make that a pig is snuffling there the thing for someone to think? How recognisably a way things are? Frege's "Der Gedanke" (1918) contains a satisfying answer.

The Slogan suggests a line of attack (whether Kant's or not) on a problem he sees as fundamental. I will call this *Kant's Problem*. Schematically, for the world to bear on the truth of things *we* think, there must be, Kant thinks, a certain match, or agreement, between the most general shapes of those things and the most general shape of what we think *about*—what we represent as being thus and so. If, but only if, there is the required match, things being as they are can *be* things being as we judge them, thus make our judgements true or false. For there to be such match is, *inter alia*, for certain very general propositions to be true. *That* they are true is, for Kant, a substantial matter, needing *proof*. Absent proof, it is doubtful whether our seeming judgements are really that, or merely masqueraders; still more doubtful whether

anything, so anything experienced, really *could* bear rationally for us on what the thing to think would be.

In Frege's terms, a thought is what brings truth into question at all. To bring truth into question is to raise, or identify, a particular question of it—e.g., whether there are apples in Sid's basket. What questions of truth there are is in general a contingent matter. But for a highly contingent episode in around February 1848, there would be no questions as to Frege's being thus and so. Things could conceivably have been that way. So, conceivably, what we *take* for such questions could turn out to be mere 'questions', masqueraders. Similarly, as Kant seems to view things, there would be no questions (with *true* answers) as to, e.g., whether an *object* was thus and so, or whether one thing *caused* another (whether, e.g., Sid tripped or was pushed) unless certain very general propositions were true (however generality is here measured). While these propositions are not quite *contingent*, they are, he seems to suppose, things for which there must at least *be* proof.

The slogan *can* suggest a key to the desired proof. Abstractly, if the same rational capacities are responsible for organising for us both our thoughts about the world, and that of it which we experience, then it would be unsurprising if, at the required level of generality, at least, they organised each in the same way. Which would be (again at some level of generality) to impose the same form on each. Such, the thought would be, can just be the required match. Such application for the slogan is obviously problematic.

McDowell's problem is not Kant's Problem, but rather the fundamental problem of perception. So his application of the slogan is not this one. It calls for independent treatment. In preparation for this I will first discuss some issues Kant faces, then introduce Frege's picture of perceptual experience.

**1. Unities:** We *are* thinking (judging) only if there is, at a general enough level, a suitable match between the shapes of our thoughts and the shape of the world. Such is the idea. In one stretch of the *Tractatus* (around 6.32-6.34) Wittgenstein tried out the opposite idea. The most general (proprietary) structure of our thoughts in any given region makes *no* commitment to how the world is, or is shaped; so is impervious *punkt* to foundering on how the world is. Wittgenstein's sample case was physics, the sample impervious structure there being Newtonian laws. Wittgenstein was wrong. Kant's Problem is not dissolved in that way.

Kant's Problem arises because we are, plausibly, thinkers of a particular sort. We are endowed with a *parochial* capacity for thought. The same put less optimistically: we are *saddled* by our nature with thought of a particular kind. Now who is to say that this is really thought at all? To us it is, but we *would* say so, wouldn't we? Kant's slogan, applied as suggested, *might* seem to reassure (whether it so reassured *Kant* or not). The application would run on these lines. Our capacities of mind saddle us with thought of a certain discernible most general shape. But, not coincidentally, our capacities for perceptual experience saddle us with experiences of that same shape, in some interesting sense of 'same'. So, of course, our experiences and thoughts match up. They were made for each other. (Cf. Kant A114.) But this rough idea is useless for its purpose.

The rough idea rests on two assumptions. First, what we *judge* to be one way or another, at least where we judge how things stand in the sublunary world, must be found among those objects of sensory awareness which are unified by the capacities in question. If, say, we judge

chipmunks to eat acorns, then chipmunks and the circumstance of their eating acorns—must be among the things we encounter in perceptual experiences so formed.

Second, what the mind thus shapes must lie within the power of the mind to shape. The relevant capacities may give us chipmunks and their careers to think about. But if shaping is called for to guarantee the needed match—between our representations and what they would then represent as such-and-such—such does guarantee this only if these capacities shape how chipmunks and acorns *are*, so as to make the ways they are ways of which our would-be judgements are either true or false. On the ‘promising’ idea, it is the work of our capacities which is to guarantee that it is really *judging* that we do of chipmunks (supposing these to be sorts of things of which we might judge). So it had better be chipmunks and acorns, or their being as they are, which these capacities shape (and offer us for delectation). If not, then however our minds shapes our *experiences* of them for our benefit, how things actually stand with them is another matter.

As the slogan has it, capacities of mind are to shape our sensory *experience* of that of which we judge. There, perhaps, is something a mind *could* shape. But our minds cannot just shape our *experience* of chipmunks so that we *experience* them as, e.g., fit to form conga lines or not, so long as whether they are really thus fit, or categorisable, remains another matter. The slogan, in present application, works only where the truth of our judgements turns on no more than what the mind’s work assures there *is* for truth to turn on, thus in forming that *of* which there is for us to judge. The truth of a judgement turns on how things are. How chipmunks must *appear* to us in sensory experience guarantees nothing where it leaves this open. If what is shaped is only how chipmunks *appear*, then the only questions of truth there are for us to raise must turn solely on how they appear.

The only thing the mind could shape to be fit for judgement of some given form (were such shaping called for) is something the mind could shape full stop; that is, something mind-dependent. It could shape this into something such judgements might be true or false of only by shaping it into something some such judgement would be true of (if not that it is an acorn, then that it is not). Such shaping of things *of which* to judge is not what the mind does in presenting the way things are as falling under generalities of particular shapes, or in shaping our thinking so as for us to entertain generalities of just those shapes. *Such* mind’s work does not touch that which is to oblige by instancing, or not, those generalities; by being or not the ways in question. It would do nothing to shape how things are into cases of things being, or not, such ways, were any such shaping called for. Exactly not: otherwise there could not be Kant’s problem. Just here lies the rub.

In 1918 Frege identified a vicious form of mind-dependence. It turns on *his* notion of a ‘*Vorstellung*’. There are two key things about a *Vorstellung*. First, for it to be is for it to have a bearer—in Frege’s term, to belong to someone’s consciousness. Second, it brooks no two bearers. If you are conscious of a *Vorstellung*, and I am conscious of one, then, *ipso facto*, these are two. The key point about a *Vorstellung* is that it cannot be an object of judgement. In Frege’s terms, there cannot be a thought—a question of truth—which decomposes as singular into a part which presents a certain *Vorstellung*—which makes the thought’s truth turn on how that *Vorstellung* is—and a part which presents a way for a *Vorstellung* to be—which makes truth turn on which *Vorstellungen* are that way.

Here I omit most of Frege’s argument. But I do think he was right. (See my 2005, 2011.) So if the kind of mind-dependence this application of the slogan needs means that what we

experience, shaped by our minds, are *Vorstellungen* in Frege's sense, then rather than winning some match between judgement and what is judged of, we will have eliminated (sublunary) judgement altogether.

But perhaps all it needs is some more benign form of mind dependence? I think not. Suppose I experience (as it were) a bit of some chipmunk's career: it (so to speak) scales a tree, acorn in mouth. Suppose, now, that *you* similarly experience some part of a chipmunk's career. Suppose one would need to be me to experience what my experience was thus of—as it were, 'that chipmunk climbing'—and ditto for you. So far, so good, at least for seeming to make the slogan apply as wished. But suppose not. Suppose you *might* have experienced the same 'chipmunk'—there is such a thing as that. Now there is room for the chipmunk to *have* a career, or bits of one, unobserved by either of us, or for that matter by anyone. Now the chipmunk is fully part of a world which is what it is independent of how we stand towards it. Judgements about chipmunks are now in good standing. But now where is the guarantee that this career, which would be what it was independent of what it (inevitably) would look to be to our sensory awareness, in fact matches up in the needed way with what were, for Kant, the most general forms of our judgements? There is none. So, it seems, the application requires chipmunks to be *Vorstellungen* in Frege's sense.

H. A. Prichard, in *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (1909), wrote,

Kant ... renders the elucidation of his meaning difficult by combining with this view of the distinction [between perception and thought] an incompatible and unwarranted theory of perception. He supposes, without ever questioning the supposition, that perception is due to the operation of things outside the mind, which act upon our sensibility and thereby produce sensations. On this supposition, what we perceive is not ... the thing itself, but a sensation produced by it. Consequently a problem arises as to the meaning on this supposition of the statements 'by the sensibility objects are given to us' and 'by the understanding they are thought.' (1909: 30)

Kant, Prichard tells us, correctly and properly distinguishes between (what belongs to) perception and (what belongs to) thought; but then obscures his good idea with (as Prichard sees it) a bad theory of perception—or, as one might see it, an infelicitous deployment of terminology. What is bad in the bad theory (or what obscures the good point) is the combination of two ideas: first, that perception involves the operation on us of 'things without the mind'; and, second, that what these things do is to provoke, or produce, awareness of something other than themselves, and, to boot, something *not* outside the mind.

Prichard speaks of things outside the *mind*, not outside the *skin*. That *these* provoke perceptual awareness cannot in itself be a bad idea. Things outside the mind are just things whose existence, and whose conditions, are independent of us—as Frege argues, just a precondition for being things one can judge about at all: things about which there *are* questions of truth, answers to which—e.g. that Sid *is* snoring—perception can place one in a position to *recognise*. But perception can so place us only insofar as these things, and their conditions are objects of our perceptual awareness. Just this comes into question with the

second term of the combination. For what things without the mind provoke, on the ‘bad theory’ is awareness of sensations, and sensations, as ordinarily conceived, are *not* things without the mind; certainly not those things which provoke them. They are, as Prichard puts it, ‘not the thing itself’. I may, e.g., have an itching sensation in the back of my throat (of the sort honeydew melon produces), but at most only a sensation *as* of ants crawling over my back, even if ‘ants crawling over my back’ may sometimes work to identify it. Whether I have the sensation is a different and independent question from that of whether there are ants. Perhaps what Kant meant by *Empfindung* is something other than what we now mean by sensation. In any case, if this is the ‘bad theory’, then on it the object of perceptual awareness is not what we may *judge* to be thus and so, not what the *truth* of a judgement might turn on—at least if a judgement (so what it is of) cannot be a (Fregean) *Vorstellung*. Such really is a ‘bad theory’, especially *in re* perception’s fundamental problem.

My present concern is not to decide whether Kant really held the bad theory. It is merely to identify some ideas to avoid. But where in Kant is there what might suggest to someone what Prichard thinks is suggested? Prichard himself refers to the opening of the “Transcendental Logic” (B74-75, A50-51). Here Kant speaks of the first of two “fundamental wellsprings of the mind” as the ability “to receive *Vorstellungen* (receptivity to impressions)”, and he says that “through this first an object is given to us”. ‘*Vorstellung*’ is, for Kant, an undefined term (with a broad use, itself partly responsible for obscuring Kant’s good point). The term at least suggests something not outside the mind. In any case, at the start of the *Kritik*, where Kant introduces his terminology (B33-34, A19-20) he tells us that *our* ability to “relate (cognitively) to objects directly” rests on an ability to be affected by objects in a certain way, namely, to get (*bekommen*) *Vorstellungen* through being affected by objects; and that this is the *only* way we are provided with *Anschauungen* (cases of “directly” relating to an object). He then tells us that “the effects of an object on the capacity for *Vorstellungen*, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation”, and that an ‘empirical’ *Anschauung* (presumably the kind at issue in perception) is a case of relating to an object directly through (by means of) sensation (*Empfindung*). At B74 (the passage Prichard refers to, he puts it this way:

*Anschauungen* [perceptions, viewings] and concepts thus constitute the two elements of all our knowledge ... Both are either pure or empirical. Empirical if they contain sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object). (B74)

So, it seems, if by ‘*Empfindung*’ Kant does mean *sensation*, then it is certainly at least suggested that the relevant *Vorstellung* (those occurring in sensation) are not ‘things outside the mind’.

So the picture is: we relate ‘directly’ to objects in perception in experiencing those sensations (getting those *Vorstellungen*) by which those objects affect us. That is, on the above suggestions, by, and in, experiencing things not outside the mind. Kant does not ever say—at least not in any passage so far—that the objects we thus relate to are themselves outside the mind. But one can see how Prichard might read that into the idea that these are objects which *affect* us, and which *produce* sensations (or sensation). Such talk is causal talk. And if Frege is right about things which are *not* outside the mind, then causal talk, as we ordinarily

understand it, simply has no application to what is not outside the mind. On the other hand, it is a strange notion of 'direct' on which we relate directly to an object in perceptual (e.g., visual) awareness of something else which it produced 'in us.' *Perhaps* Kant had neither idea in mind.

If we buy the bad picture so far (bracketing the issue whether it is Kant's), we are then in a position to extract two more suggestions from his (perhaps unfortunate) deployment of terminology. For the first we need the term 'Erscheinung', which Kant introduces thus: "The undetermined object of an empirical *Anschauung* is called *Erscheinung*." (B34/A20) He then says:

In an appearance (*Erscheinung*), I call what corresponds to the sensation its matter, but that which assure that the multiplicity of the appearance *can be* structured in certain relations, the form of the appearance. For that by which sensations alone arrange themselves, and can be places in a certain form, cannot itself be more sensation. Thus, despite the fact that the matter of all appearances is only given *a posteriori*, the form of these must lie ready in the mind *a priori* for them collectively, and thus can be considered apart from all sensation. (Ibid)

There are two suggestions here. First, that what is produced in us by objects relating us to them directly—by their affecting our capacity to get *Vorstellungen*—is a multiplicity, or mass, of *Vorstellungen*—in the case at hand, sensations—which it is then open to our minds, or capacities of mind, to arrange for us in various ways, where the arrangement is done according to *a priori* principles, thus in ways *not* deriving from, nor achieved by, things without the mind.

This first idea, whether Kant's or not, can be fitted together with the use he actually makes of the slogan from which this work starts:

Thus this same understanding, and, to be sure, by just the same transactions by means of which, in the case of concepts, through analytical unity, it created the logical form of a judgement, also, by means of the synthetic unity it brings overall to an *Anschauung*'s multiplicity, brings a transcendental unity to its *Vorstellungen*, which, accordingly, are called *pure concepts of the understanding*, and which apply *a priori* to objects, as cannot be established by general logic. (B105/A79)

Putting all so far together, objects (or those in question here) are what we relate to directly through *Erscheinungen*, whose multiplicity (or, perhaps, inchoate mass) of sensation is unified by *a priori* powers of the mind, yielding the result that a certain set of concepts ('pure concepts of the understanding') apply to these objects (to which we thus relate directly) *a priori*. Really?

There is the obvious problem. What are these objects to which certain concepts apply *a priori* (so of which certain very general things are true)? Are they those objects which, working on our sensibility, generate things other than themselves (*Vorstellung*, sensation) for us to be aware of? Then how can the way (or ways) those other things are formed by our minds into objects of our sensory (thereby other) awareness (ways the ‘matter’ of an *Erscheinung* admits of being organised), *a priori* or not, assure anything about what concepts do, or do not, apply to *those* objects, distinct as they are from what is thus organised? Or is it that the objects in question here—now objects of our sensory awareness—just *are* the results of such constructions, or impositions of form? So they are constructs out of the products of what Kant calls ‘Sinnlichkeit’—our capacity for sensation. In which case, presumably, they are *not* objects without the mind. In which case Frege’s point applies. They generate no questions of truth; no questions of some one of them as to whether it is thus and so. So the question what *concepts* apply to them simply does not arise.

Several ideas may mask the problem here. First, there is the idea that studying the work of the mind on input generated by, but distinct from, objects without the mind (and generally without the skin) is a perfectly respectable, in fact fruitful, branch of empirical psychology. So it must be an enterprise in good standing. Light forms images on retinas. These generate signals which are processed in given ways. The upshot is: we see what we do. This much is, by now, at least, a commonplace. Call the whole thing—such generation and processing of signals—the visual system. Science studies the visual system, and with good result. The workings of the mind which Kant posits here, the idea is, are formally, functionally, just like that. But this idea is wrong. The commonplace, and its expression in the empirical study of visual systems, is entirely compatible with this idea: what the visual system does is to furnish, or afford, us awareness of various features of what (generally) lies beyond our skin—e.g., colour boundaries, edges, angles, depth, animate things (spots and cows). There is no warrant in the commonplace for the idea that objects outside the mind (e.g., those beyond our skins) produce in us awareness of *something else*. And even if, on occasion, they did this (as, e.g., when our eyes water), there is still less warrant for the idea that our awareness of these extradermal objects (now ‘direct’ only by courtesy) is *via* and through awareness of such other things.

The dilemma would not worry someone who, rejecting, or just deaf to, Frege, was an unapologetic idealist, an idealist *sans phrase*. For such a one there is another idea: embrace the dilemma’s second horn. One could then take a Berkeleyan tack. Given that the objects of our perceptual awareness, so of our empirical judgements, are *not* without the mind, we can, nonetheless, separate a category within them, objects ‘without our skins’, extradermal objects, where ‘extradermal’ is now understood in terms of ‘as though’s—what is, e.g., as though one could touch it with which what is as though his hand. This could be contrasted with, e.g., a sensation as of ants crawling across one’s back, which, though at first blush as though there are ants is, on examination, independent of whether there are or not. Still the sensation, even if the right visual impressions do not ensue. It has been suggested that Kant’s ‘empirical realism’ is like that. But it is said that this incensed Kant. And indeed we might expect better of him. Anyway, though I *have* omitted his argument here, one turns a deaf ear to Frege at one’s peril.

There is a further idea. Its image is: reality (the world without the mind) is a sort of seamless, flowing, mass out of which a mind is free to carve shapes *ad lib*. It is, so to speak, like a sheet of *‘stsie* (*hostie*) before the wafers are stamped out. One might stamp out wafers. Or one might stamp out *bolachos de São Gonçalo*, depending on the stamps on board. Other

issues aside, the idea here will not serve Kant's purpose. One can stamp wafers out of sheets of 'stsie'. These will stand in spatial relations to each other. These relations will be governed by certain general principles. But all that is only because the sheet itself is already an object in space, standing in spatial relations, etc., etc. Nothing new is won, certainly no new guarantees, by the carving. The truths whose status Kant is out to secure are meant to be among the most general ones governing those objects we (think we) think about. It is obscure how the carving image helps here. At this level of abstraction, carving cannot conjure new sorts of objects, or anyway new sorts of guarantees, into existence.

But perhaps we are looking for truth, or guarantees of it, in the wrong place here. Suppose we distinguish between generalities and things which instance them: on the one side, the sort of generality intrinsic to a thought, so to a concept where, as with Kant, this is an element in a thought (though not where it is what it is for Frege); on the other, e.g., instances of things being as they are according to some thought. Then one might think: the truth of the sorts of truths which interest Kant really turns on relations between things on the first side of this distinction, generalities; whereas what perception, or *Sinnlichkeit*, furnishes us is awareness of what falls on the second side—things which instance generalities. On the side of the generalities, there is, plausibly, *some* room for the mind, or its capacities, to furnish us with a particular range of these to engage with in thought—a particular range, not the only one there is—and that there is, accordingly, some room for the mind, in its operations, to provide, among the things there thus are for us to think, things whose truth is guaranteed by their very nature. There is something in this idea, though not enough, I think, to give us what Kant might want. (Again, it is in general a contingent matter what generalities there are. There is, so far as we know, no level of generality, or other dividing line, beyond which a would-be way for things to be is *absolutely* immune to potential slings and arrows of what there may be to instance it—just *could* not fail to be genuine.) But *such* issues need Frege on hand.

Kant says just the right thing (nearly) when, working his way towards the transcendental deduction (A-version) he writes,

... Receptivity can only make knowledge possible when combined with spontaneity. This is now the basis of a threefold synthesis, which necessarily occurs in all knowledge: namely, *apprehension* of *Vorstellungen*, as modification of the mind in an *Anschaung*, *Reproduction* of this same thing in the imagination, and its *Recognition* in a concept. (A97)

What matters here is the distinction between apprehension and recognition. The first, apprehension, is awareness of what falls on the second side of the distinction I have just drawn—what *instances* (or fails to) various generalities. Such *of course* is not yet knowledge, or anyway, knowledge-that. Recognition is (or ought to be) recognition of *such* a thing's falling under, or instancing, some generality—something which only a concept (in Kant's sense), or, more properly (if we follow Frege) a whole thought, could bring into the picture. Only with that do we get something which *might* be instanced. With this distinction all is going well enough. It is just this which Prichard wished not to be obscured by Kant's further deployment of terminology. Unfortunately the seeds of obscurity are already sown here by



Kant's use of the term 'Vorstellung', both for what is generated by *Sinnlichkeit* in furnishing us with *Anschauungen* (cases of 'directly' relating to an object) and for *Begriffe* (concepts). (It is an *Anschauung's* *Vorstellungen* which, in B105, are called 'pure concepts of the understanding'.) The suggestion (Kant may not have meant) is: one material, two sorts of operations on it. (Frege, too, gives 'Vorstellung' a wide reach. But for him *Vorstellungen* are what judgements are neither made of nor about.) To get clearer on what Kant's terminology leaves unclear, I turn to Frege.

**2. Unlocking:** Thus far I have been dealing with *suggestions* one might find in Kant. Perhaps Prichard is right: these arise merely from an unfortunate deployment of terminology, obscuring those good ideas which are really Kant's. Or perhaps the suggestions *are* Kant's (though not necessarily unequivocally so). Be such things as they may, my purpose here has merely been, using Kant, to set out some bad ideas about perception—without yet fully unfolding what is bad about them. Frege offers a much better picture of perception than anything on offer so far. It is a good framework within which to see what is wrong with what I have labeled 'bad ideas'. To develop his picture I begin near the end of "Der Gedanke", where he writes,

Sense impressions are certainly a necessary ingredient of sensory observation, and these are part of the inner world. ... These alone do not open the outer world for us. Perhaps there is a being that only has sense impressions, without seeing or feeling things [by touch]. Having sense impressions is not yet seeing things. How is it that I see the tree just where I see it? ... Someone else sees the tree in the same place. He, too, has two retinal images, which, however, differ from mine. ... And still, we move about in the same outer world. Having sense impressions is, to be sure, necessary for seeing, but not sufficient. What still must be added is nothing sensory. And it is just this which unlocks the outer world for us; for without this non-sensory thing each of us remains shut up in his inner world. Since the difference thus lies in what is non-sensory, a non-sensory thing could also, where no sensory thing helps, lead us out of the inner world and let us grasp thought. (1918: 75)

Frege mentions two things here: first, being shut up in an inner world, second, having this unlocked for us by capacities of a certain sort. What would we experience if shut up? What is added to experience when the outer world is unlocked? First question first.

A creature with senses locked in an inner world (we, if we were so locked) would get from his senses nothing but sense impressions. For (Prichard's) Kant, objects without the mind impress themselves on us. They generate sense impressions. The way that works is this: they stimulate a faculty of mind which, accordingly, generates objects of sensory (e.g., visual) awareness *other than* the objects which stimulated it. For Prichard's Kant, as later for Donald Davidson (??), these are sensations. For Frege, too, objects without the mind generate

impressions—for us as things stand, for the creature locked in an inner world (for us if so locked). But Frege's story does not require these impressions to be of anything other than the objects which generate them. Our experience can be awareness of *these*, and of nothing else. There need be no *other* objects of visual, or other sensory, awareness. There need be nothing like sensations. What changes when the outer world is unlocked need not be, and for Frege is not, what our sensory experience is *of*, of *what* we enjoy sensory awareness. Being locked in an inner world is not a matter of being furnished with the wrong things to experience.

For Kant the capacity which is stimulated by objects without the mind is a capacity to produce *Vorstellungen*. For Frege, too, an inner world is made of *Vorstellungen*. For someone locked in an inner world, life consists, so far as he can tell, of, *so to speak*, just one *Vorstellung* after another. (Even that 'after another' goes too far.) But Kant's use of 'Vorstellung' and Frege's are quite different. For Kant (so far as I can tell) 'Vorstellung' is an undefined term, a primitive. It *seems* to embrace both objects of sensory awareness and 'concepts', whatever Kant thinks concepts are. Frege *explains* exactly what *he* means by 'Vorstellung'. In synopsis, the key features of a (Fregean) *Vorstellung* are these. First, a *Vorstellung* requires a bearer. It belongs to the contents of someone's consciousness. For it to be is for it to be in someone's consciousness—in some sense, something *he* is conscious of. Second, a *Vorstellung* brooks no two bearers. Imagistically, suppose you now have a *Vorstellung*, and I have one. Then *ipso facto* two *Vorstellungen* are in play. Nothing in Frege's notion of a *Vorstellung* requires this to be an object of sensory awareness. (The same, one hopes, holds for Kant.) Frege's examples of *Vorstellungen* span a wide space, including, besides sense-impressions, fantasies ('creations of the power of imagination), sensations, feelings, moods, inclinations, wishes—but not decisions. (Cf. 1918: 66)

Before me is a pig munching petunias (or snuffling beneath an oak). There is an object without the mind, generating in me impressions (for Frege as I read him, of itself). I see the pig. I enjoy visual awareness of it, and its munching, or snuffling, and so on. The pig is something for *one* to experience. It brooks awareness by many. It is no *Vorstellung*. My current visual awareness of the pig—that episode of experiencing what I now do of the pig's being as it is, that particular glimpsing of the pig—is another matter. For experiencing *that* glimpsing, for undergoing that particular case of pig-viewing, you would need to be me, then. So here, in the particular case—here one of a sensory experiencing—we can isolate a *Vorstellung* in Frege's sense. I had that *Vorstellung*: to have it was just to undergo that episode of experiencing I then underwent. If I were locked in an inner world, such would be all that was left for me, all life would consist of *for me*—not that what would be *left* in such a case need have any substantial role to play where the outer world *is* unlocked.

What is going on here is related closely to a fundamental difference between arguments for scepticism and arguments for sense-data. Both may appeal to the possibility of ringers—perfect illusions of, e.g., a pig snuffling, things which, if experienced, simply could not be told apart from that by sight. But the appeal must be substantially different in each case. As for knowledge, what I cannot *tell* is liable to bear straightaway on what I know. If I cannot tell Pia from her twin, that may well impeach my claim to know that I saw her passing arm in arm with Vic. By contrast, the possibility of ringers does not bear (directly) on what I saw. If that pig is what was before me, then that pig is what I saw. It matters not at all that things would have looked the same had there been a ringer. For that reason, in arguments for sense data, appeal to ringers must be supplemented by some (usually easily resistible) assumption as to what seeing must be (e.g., something such that I *see* something red, even if no red thing is

before me). Locked in an inner world, whether it is a pig or a pig-ringer means nothing to me. Such is not a difference I am equipped to be responsive to. But none of that bears on whether my visual awareness was, in fact, of a pig. What matters to *that* is only what was before me, what there then was for me to have visual experience of. Or at least what does *not* matter is whether I am locked in or not.

Such is the beginning of an answer to our next question. What goes missing for a creature locked in? Or, conversely, what is added if the outer world is unlocked? What is missing is that, while he experiences the world around him, how it is is not thereby *revealed* to him. He sees (or hears, or feels, etc.) things being as they are. But he does not thereby see *how* things are—not if that involves seeing what *ways* things are. For a start, he cannot recognise, or see, what he is doing as what there is for *one* to do. He sees, e.g., the pig snuffling. But while *this is* what he experiences, he cannot see what he experiences (a pig) as something there is to be experienced, by an experiencer which need not be him. Though he *does* such a thing, he cannot take in his so doing.

What, then, is changed when the outer world is unlocked? *Not* what he experiences visually. It is not as if one sort of object of visual experience is conjured into, or exchanged for, another. In Frege's picture, at least, there is no room for that. Rather, Frege tells us, what effects the unlocking is something non-sensory (a *Nichtsinnliche*). And its products are not objects of sensory awareness. To understand this properly we need to introduce another idea of Frege's, perhaps the most fundamental distinction that he draws. Frege writes,

A thought always contains something which reaches beyond the particular case, by means of which it presents this to consciousness as falling under some given generality. (1882: 189) (*Kernsatz* 4).

Two things are in play here: first, 'the particular case', or particular cases; second, generalities under which these fall (and are brought, or presented as falling, by a thought). I start with the generalities. There is, the idea is, a kind of generality intrinsic to a thought. It is intrinsic to *any* thought, not what distinguishes one kind of thought, the general ones, from others. It consists in its relation to a particular generality, that under which it presents, or represents, *the* particular case as falling. In philosophy we typically think of a thought as the thought *that* such-and-such. But we can also think of it as a thought *of* a (given) way for things to be. It is a (or the) thought *of*, say, it being so that Sid is eating peanuts. As the thought *that* Sid is doing this, it presents this way in a certain way—as enjoying a certain status: being a way things are; as realised by things. We can then think of that way for things to be as the generality under which a thought presents the particular case as falling. The generality Frege has in mind lies here.\*\*

Frege explains a thought as what brings truth into question at all. Such is done only in bringing it into question in some determinate way, by raising, or speaking to, some particular question of truth—e.g., the question whether Sid is eating peanuts. Now the idea is: whether a thought is *true*—what the *answer* is to the question of truth it raises—depends on how things are. But, the idea continues, in the nature of the case it cannot depend on *everything* in how things are. Not *everything* can matter to its truth. It would (or might) still be a case of Sid eating peanuts if Pia's Porsche were not in the shop, or if *A Tasquinha* were closed, and Sid

were doing what he was doing somewhere else—say, at *La Bellota Formosa*. Or even (*just possibly*) if Sid's shirt were tucked in, or he had changed out of his flip-flops. Things being such as for Sid to be eating peanuts is tolerant enough to allow for all that and more. *That* it is is not just an accident of the example I happened to pick. For this purpose any other would have done as well. So we can say: for any way for things to be, there is an indefinitely extendible *range* of cases which would be ones of things being that way. Or, if not that, then an indefinitely extendible range of cases which would be ones of things *not* being that way. Or, often, both. Such is the generality of ways for things to be. Accordingly, it is the generality of that 'something' in any thought.

I turn to the particular case. This is that which a thought presents as *falling under* some generality. So, then, what must be a case of the relevant generality if things are to be as the thought presents them? One good answer is: the way things are, or, in different mode, things being as they are. Sometimes we can be more specific. In the above example, *Sid's* doing what he now is, or, if you like, peanuts being subjected to the treatment they now are. Things being as they now are, of course, comes only once. Now, in fact, time passing, it is gone. But then, in ten minutes things will be as they then are. That will be another particular case. *It* must be a case of Sid eating peanuts if things are to be as the thought that he is then eating them presents them. A thought's generality may also be seen as a restriction on generalities of other sorts—e.g., on Sid being something or other, and on something/some things eating peanuts.

A particular case may instance things being such that Sid is eating. A way for things to be is instanced by—or, in active voice, reaches to—a range of particular cases. There is no such thing as instancing a particular case. Each generality has its *way* of reaching; there is what it would be to be reached by it. No such thing holds of particular cases. What would be a case of the sun setting over the *foz* is not to be decided by, or found in, any particular case of the sun's so doing. The point here is perhaps reflected in the absolute gulf Frege finds between objects and concepts. But the present distinction is prior to, more basic, than that.

If we thought of generalities as forming a domain, a natural name for it would be 'the conceptual'. If we thought of particular cases as forming a domain, they might then be called, 'the nonconceptual'. I will so speak. Things conceptual—ways for things to be, or for *a* thing to be—participate in two sorts of relations. First, there are relations between them. E.g., one, or several such things may *entail* another. Or, short of that, a given such thing may *bear* on another in some given way. Second, there are relations between the conceptual and the nonconceptual, the most fundamental and important of these being that of instancing, or its converse, reaching. Something nonconceptual—a particular case—may be a case of, instance, something conceptual, e.g., things being such that that pig is snuffling. About a different but related pair of contrasting sorts of thing Frege wrote,

The fundamental logical relation is that of an object falling under a concept. All relations between concepts can be reduced to this.  
(1892-1895: 128)

The conceptual-nonconceptual distinction is not that between concepts and objects. (It is more like that between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*.) But one might also, plausibly, see instancing as the fundamental relation on which all relations within the conceptual rest. Or at least it is

fundamental to this: to what identifies any given conceptual item as the thing it is. One is reminded of this in the mere fact that for, e.g., snuffling to entail having a nose (if this is so) just is for whatever instanced (was a case of) something snuffling *ipso facto* to instance, be a case of, something having a nose. Suppose we know, e.g., that being red excludes being green. (Suppose, for working purposes, that it does.) That such a relation holds between these two ways for a thing to be does not in itself identify either of them either as *being red* (for a thing to be red), or as *being green*—or not independent of the reach of at least one of these items. Being red excludes many things. As does being green. *Being red* is identified by its reach, and by nothing short of this. For it to be the way for a thing to be it is for it to reach as it does, thus *to what it does*: to what it in fact does, and—since it might have reached to more had there been one more pig or peony—to what it *would*. *Mutatis mutandis* for *grasping* ways for *things* to be. Grasping *what* way for a thing (or for *things*) to be any given way (being red, say) is, minimally, grasping how participates in the instancing relation—to what it would reach.

Frege draws on (or perhaps elaborates) the conceptual-nonconceptual distinction in distinguishing seeing an object (or bit of history)—henceforth ‘O-seeing’—from seeing-that—henceforth ‘T-seeing’. There is, on the first side of the distinction, such things as seeing the pig, seeing the pig snuffling, the pig’s snuffling, the pig’s muddiness, the pig tiring. On the other side of the distinction is seeing *that* the pig is snuffling, so seeing it *to be* snuffling, or muddy, or etc. Seeing, on the first side of the distinction, is a *perceptual* accomplishment, *visual* awareness of something historical—of the world without the mind, and, in the case of seeing, generally without the skin, engaged in being as it is. Seeing, on the far side, is *not* perceptual. One might see that the pig is snuffling either in seeing the pig snuffling or in seeing (truffle-hunting) Pia’s happy little schottische. Different capacities no doubt are drawn on in each sort of case. But in each case the seeing involves *recognition* of something which need not be recognised for O-seeing. The object of T-seeing involves an ingredient which does not occur at all in O-seeing-O. To T-see is to relate to (*inter alia*) something which is not the sort of thing to be visible, tangible, or etc.—not a possible object of sensory awareness.

In 1918 Frege explains the difference thus:

But don’t we see that the sun has set? And don’t we thereby see that this is true? That the sun has set is no object which emits light rays which arrive in my eyes, is no visible thing like the sun itself. That the sun has set is recognised as true on the basis of sensory experience. (1918: 61)

In 1897 he explains it this way:

But don’t I see that this flower has five petals? One can say that, but then uses the word ‘see’ not in the sense of mere sensing things via light, but one means a thought or judgement connected with that. (1897: 149)

In 1918 the stress is on the fact that the object of T-seeing, e.g., that the sun has set, is not an object of sensory awareness. It cannot be before one's eyes, since it is not the sort of thing to have location at all. *It* does not sink below the horizon as the sun does. Nor was it already beyond the horizon waiting for the sun—in contrast to the pig, which *is* to be seen beneath the oak. In 1897 the stress is on the fact that T-seeing involves a relation to a thought—a thought, of course, being *just* the sort of thing which, as Frege rightly insists, is neither visible nor tangible, nor etc.

But in both years the key notion is that of recognition. Pia sees the pig before her eyes. She recognises what she thus sees as a case of—as instancing—a pig snuffling beneath the oak—a certain generality, a way *for* things to be. Such recognition is what draws on what might rightly be called a conceptual capacity: familiarity with what belongs to the conceptual, with that whose instancing one takes in—grasping what it is, e.g., for a pig to be snuffling; what makes it recognisable that *this* is a case of it.

What Pia O-sees is precisely what *does* instance a pig being beneath the oak—nothing short of the pig, as it is, beneath the oak, as *it* is. Such is what is *there* to be seen. Suppose she lacked, or failed to draw on, the conceptual capacities just mentioned. She would still O-see what was there to *be* seen, what in fact instances the generality in question. She would just fail to recognise its doing so. The capacity to recognise a pig as a pig—being *au fait* with so much of the conceptual—can hardly be the capacity to transform something else into something which is then recognisable as a pig. Such would not be a capacity to recognise pigs at all. The capacity had better be one applicable to what was anyway, recognised or not, a pig, and to appreciate how *just that* relates to that certain bit of the conceptual, *for something to be a pig*.

Recognising pigs typically involves capacities of two different sorts: a capacity to tell a pig at sight; and a capacity to recognise what counts as something being a pig as so counting. As we ordinarily conceive the first sort of capacity, and as empirical psychology might study it, it depends on a hospitable environment for being a capacity at all. Those features of the porcine it is responsive to are ones no one would suppose capture what would count as something being a pig. My capacity to tell a pig when I see one ends when I enter the land of uncannily pig-like marsupials. And if (known to me or not) I tell a pig by its unmistakably porcine snout, I would never suppose that to be a pig just is to have such a snout. Plastic surgery might sever that connection in either direction. A capacity to tell a pig by sight is responsiveness to *visible*, and, quite likely, to *visual*, features of the beasts among us. So it might, with *some* justice, be reckoned a visual capacity—though not one to *generate* objects of visual awareness, as in Prichard's Kant's bad theory. Still, one cannot recognise a pig *to be* a pig without thereby entering into transactions with the conceptual; without exercising mastery of what the instancing relation relates—so without engaging with thoughts, or drawing on conceptual capacities in the present sense.\*\*

What is operative in seeing-T, then—what distinguishes it from O-seeing as not a *perceptual* accomplishment—is a non-sensory (*nichtsinnliche*) ingredient—just the sort of ingredient which, he tells us, unlocks an outer world for us. For Frege, it is *one* such ingredient which plays both roles. Indeed, they are not really two roles: being fit to engage in T-seeing *is* having the outer world unlocked for one. Without this *Nichtsinnliche*, one might still experience visually. At various moments, things might be for one visually as they thus are. *What* one is experiencing visually could be—might as well be—(some of) the world around him, e.g., a pig snuffling beneath an oak. Then this is what he O-sees. But *that* this is so is

nothing to him. He sees things being as they are. In one sense, perhaps, this is seeing *how* things are. But it is not seeing *what* ways things in fact are. Such is a matter of recognising generalities as instanced. That would be T-seeing, beyond reach to one missing this *nichtsinnliche* ingredient. T-seeing is on offer only to one who knows his way around within the conceptual, who is at home there with its inhabitants. *Such* familiarity is not for the senses to supply.

Someone who sees that pig snuffling does something there is for *one*, not just himself, to do. His being as he is is thus a case of something there is for one to do. He, or his being as he is, instances a certain generality. But without Frege's missing ingredient—conceptual capacities, ones to see the *nichtsinnliche* for what it is—this would be nothing *he* could recognise. Not that it is not there *to be* recognised. Not that he does not see the pig. But the fact of his doing so is something he is blind to. He is equally blind to the facts of *what* he sees—the pig, and nothing less—instancing the generalities it does, among which *a thing being a pig*. Awareness of the world around him is not what goes missing here. What goes missing is rather recognition of its being this.

If what the ingredient-less creature experiences visually is, in fact, a pig snuffling beneath an oak, then he is experiencing, not just what others might, but also what has a worldly career, a career of interactions with the rest of our shared environment, which is independent of its being experienced, either by this creature or by others, and which is liable to continue (and much of which does continue) without being observed. It is the career of a continuant, with an historical start and end. It is an animate career, a porcine career. One might go on. To do so is just to continue the indefinitely extendible litany of all that which this creature is blind to. Such blindness just is, at least within Frege's picture, confinement in an inner world.

Honeydew melon is wont to produce a certain itch upper throats. Call this honeydew itch. It is a sensation. It thus contrasts with pigs and snuffling. Like experiencing *a* pig, or *some* snuffling, honeydew itch can be experienced by *someone*, not necessarily so-and-so, not necessarily now. It contrasts with pigs thus: if I now experience a pig beneath the oak, that particular case of a pig's presence might be experienced by *one*, not necessarily me (though, discounting film, etc., necessarily then). Whereas this instance of itchiness—the one I am now experiencing—can be experienced (felt) only by me, now. Experiencing honeydew itch is still, like experiencing a snuffling pig, falling under a generality, being a way for one to be. But absent the *nichtsinnliche* ingredient there would be no difference *to me* between experiencing a case of the itch and experiencing a case of a pig snuffling. To me, it is all experiencing things being as they are, *fertig*. It might as well all just be sensation—so far as I am concerned, I lacking the ingredient. But it had better not all just *be* experiencing sensation. Sensations are not recognisable as pigs, because they are *not* pigs. *No* ingredient could make what I experience recognisable as a pig if it is *not* a pig. No ingredient could conjure what is *not* a pig—some sensations—into a pig, whether one which I thereby experience or not. If any ingredient is to be *any* help, it had better be a pig I experience all along.

Perception's role is to provide awareness of the nonconceptual, or the particular case. Without such awareness there is no seeing, or even taking, the instancing relation to hold between anything and anything (just as there is no taking it to hold without having the conceptual in view). If perception is to perform this role, it must confine itself to it. Conceptual capacities come into the picture only with our operations in thought on what

perception has anyway provided; only with our ability to see when what we have O-seen (heard, felt, tasted) of how things are reveals it as what counts as things being thus and so.

**3. The Given:** John McDowell applies Kant's slogan, not to Kant's Problem, but to another. For his purpose he reads the slogan thus:

The unity of intuitional content reflects an operation of the same unifying function that is operative in the unity of judgments, in that case actively exercised. That is why it is right to say the content unified in intuitions is of the same kind as the content unified in judgments: that is, conceptual content. We could not have intuitions, with their specific forms of unity, if we could not make judgments, with their corresponding forms of unity. (2008: 7 (2009: 264))

For Frege there *is* no 'unifying function' operative in the unity of judgements. Whole thoughts, or judgements, come first. A judgement decomposes (non-uniquely) into elements. If such elements do not already jointly form a judgement, they are no elements at all. No unifying work is called for. No unifying work could form a judgement of what were not already elements in this sense. Frege's point, of course, is about *being* true, not *holding* true. There is no *logical* work of unifying. Perhaps there is still *psychological* work. Such work would lie somewhere in forming particular things which *contain*, or *express* thoughts. It would be work of allowing us to have thoughts in mind, or stand psychologically otherwise towards them. It remains to say just what such 'unifying work' McDowell may have in mind. First, though, what work does he want the slogan to do?

The central question, help for which McDowell hopes to find in the slogan as he reads it, is, I think, a better one than Kant's Problem. It is how perception can make the world bear *for us* on the thing to think. I call this 'the fundamental problem of perception'. There is the world, populated by such things as pigs snuffling, their snuffling, the aged, still ageing, oaks under which they stand, their standing there, and so on. And there are the things for us to think: that a pig is snuffling, that there may be truffles at that oak's roots, and so on. The snuffling is audible, the pigs visible, but *that* that pig is snuffling is, logically, conceptually, a very different sort of thing. So how can sensitivity to the first sort of thing, in whatever form it is granted, reveal to *us* how we are to stand towards things of the second sort? Good question. But now, McDowell thinks that there is a certain sort of condition on any adequate answer to that question: it must avoid 'The Myth of The Given'. So *McDowell's* problem is to find an answer to the fundamental problem which avoids this 'Myth'—which satisfies both desiderata at once.

In 1991 McDowell spoke of an answer which did not avoid this 'myth' as

a vain appeal to the Given, in the sense of bare presences that are supposed to constitute the ultimate grounds of empirical judgement (1994: 24)



An appeal to the Given thus succumbs to this ‘myth’, which in 2008 McDowell explains this way:

Givenness in the sense of the Myth would be an availability for cognition to subjects whose getting what is supposedly Given to them does not draw on capacities required for the sort of cognition in question. (2008/2009: 256)

Of course, no one could get what was given him (so nor be given it) without the capacity to get it. But ‘getting it’, in McDowell’s sense here, would, in relevant cases, draw on capacities for cognition—capacities suitable to the thing given. So getting it presumably means coming to stand towards what was given in a suitable cognitive way.

We now need to ask what, for McDowell’s purpose, the suitable way of standing is, and what suitable capacities for so standing would be. I think we get a clue to this in what McDowell takes to be just another form of the Myth:

to think sensibility by itself, without involvement of capacities that belong to our rationality, can make things available for our cognition. (2008: 2 (2009: 258))

Which, in turn, he takes to mean:

The rational faculty that distinguishes us from non-rational animals must also be operative in our being perceptually given things to know. (2008: 1 (2009: 257))

So the Myth now becomes: perception can place us to know things in making us aware of what makes these thing knowable (or recognisable) without there being operative in it those rational capacities which distinguish us from non-rational animals. Perception, when it is working right, makes us aware of how things are. Seeing, for example, or hearing, or smelling, just *is* a form of awareness of how things are—of, that is, things being as they are. It thereby permits us awareness of *what* ways things are. Seeing, and hearing, the pig snuffling, you see, or recognise, that the pig is snuffling. Sniffing, you smell that the *daube* is burning. In these last examples we see relevant ways of standing towards those things towards which we do

stand with the fundamental problem solved. The ‘myth’ is that this can be accomplished without ‘those capacities which distinguish us from thoughtless brutes’ already operative in perception presenting us with that which so places us.

So the idea now is: the way in which perception makes the world bear *for us* on *what* to think must be through work of our rational capacities (what unthinking brutes lack) in its presenting what it does (in presenting us with ‘things to know’). Or, put otherwise, perception *could* make the world bear for us on what to think *only* if those rational capacities were at work *in it* in its presenting perceptually (e.g., visually) what it does for us to be aware of. Or at least all this is meant to be so if the ‘myth’, or what McDowell understands by this, really is a myth.

What (thus unmissable) work might be done by these rational capacities? McDowell addresses that question in passages like these:

The idea is not just that experience yields items—experiences—to which judgments are rational responses. That would be consistent with taking rational capacities to be operative only in responses to experiences, not in experiences themselves. ...

But that would not do justice to the role of experience in our acquisition of knowledge. ... it is in experiencing itself that we have things perceptually given to us for knowledge. Avoiding the Myth requires capacities that belong to reason to be operative in experiencing itself, not just in judgments made in response to experience. (2008: 3 (2009: 259))

An object is present to a subject in an intuition whether or not the “I think” accompanies any of the intuition’s content. But any of the content of an intuition must be able to be accompanied by the “I think”. And for the “I think” to accompany some of the content of, say, a visual intuition of mine is for me to *judge* that I am visually confronted by an object with such-and-such features. (2008: 8 (2009: 265))

Experience thus represents things *as* being thus and so; it remains for thinking to add a force: not bear representing-*as*, but representing things *to be* that way (if we so respond). *I think* that things are a certain way—such that that pig is snuffling. But, whether I think this or not, experience has already represented the world *as being* such that the pig is snuffling (a feat which might be done with no commitment to whether such is actually the case—as, e.g., in the antecedent of a conditional, or a request (‘See to it that that pig is snuffling’)).

There are two ideas here which need examining. One is that ‘capacities that belong to reason’ must be involved in experience itself, and not just in response to it. The other is that intuitions have *content*, where this is content susceptible to being accompanied by an ‘I think’, in which case it, or that instance of so accompanying it, is a judgement. (McDowell means to use ‘intuition’ roughly as Kant uses ‘Anschauung’: a particular instance of, as McDowell puts it, ‘having in view’ (2008: 5), or, perhaps, a viewing. In the (perceptual) experiential case of

concern here, I take this to be just perceiving—enjoying, or being afforded, perceptual awareness of. What is given in perception would then be, at least first of all, that of which one enjoyed, or was afforded, perceptual awareness—e.g., a pig, or some snuffling.)

This second idea is, for the first time here, an idea about the work that ‘rational capacities’ would have to do in our being given things perceptually. They would have to invest intuitions with content. (This should not be read so as to suggest that there is such a thing as an intuition without content. If not, then rational capacities are (partly) responsible for their being intuitions.) Here, then, we have an application of Kant’s Slogan, read so as to do the work on McDowell’s problem which he thinks needs doing. Whatever rational capacities provide us with the contents of attitudes or stances, such as judgements—make such contents available to us towards which to stand, *thus* available to our consciousness in thought—now also form our intuitions—our viewings, or havings in view—so that these, too, contain these same contents—I have suggested, in the form of pure representing-as. I will turn presently to the question *why* one might think such a thing.

Now we also have a reading of McDowell’s talk of being given only what one has a capacity to get. If I am perceptually given something to know—if knowledge of it is made available to me perceptually—then to *get* what I am given (thus to know it) is for me to stand in a certain way towards, *inter alia*, something conceptual in the sense of section 2. I stand in a certain way towards some given way *for* things to be—e.g., such that a pig is snuffling: I recognise it as a way things are. So for me to get what I am given is for me to draw on, *a fortiori* to enjoy, conceptual capacities. They are at work in the getting. But getting here—recognising, knowing—is a *response* to what I am given. McDowell’s idea is that this is not enough. Those same capacities must also be at work in that case itself of being given, of my having the world perceptually in view, of my being presented with that to which I thus respond. Otherwise I could not have been given the thing to get at all. Eventually we will need to raise the question why someone might think this. For the moment I work to make that question urgent.

I have led the discussion back to imagery of giving and getting. The ways this imagery might work already carry intimations that there is something wrong with at least this last idea of McDowell’s. Consider Uncle Willard. Returning from the fens, he presents me with a stuffed bittern. He has thus made a raft of things available for (my) cognition, most of which I am, as things stand, in no position to get. He offers opportunities which I cannot *yet* exploit. Suppose I am asked whether there are *greater* bitterns in the fens. I haven’t a clue. Staring at the stuffed bittern is no help. But now I study bitterns. In time I acquire the ability to tell the lesser from the greater at sight. Now I look at Uncle Willard’s bittern and find in it a message for me. It is, plainly, a greater bittern. So there must be greater bitterns in the fens. In one perfectly good sense, I was given something to get when Uncle Willard gave me the stuffed bird. That bird was full of information about the fens (in the only way our mute friends could be). But it takes sophistication to extract these riches from the bird’s *Gestalt*. One must know that there is such a thing as a greater bittern, so know of a certain way for things to be: being one. One thus needs some grasp of what it would be for a thing to be one; then, quite a different matter, of how to tell one (here at sight), in particular, from a lesser bittern. Such things came to me only with time. But as soon as they had come, the bittern stood there, as it long had, ready to serve.

Might perception fit this model? Hasn’t it already? Unfortunately, before I could acquire

the needed ornithological expertise, Uncle Willard's trophy disappeared—an overly enthusiastic char. I was still to learn that there are both greater and lesser bitterns, much less how to tell the one from the other. Such knowledge was to come, though. When it did, all was revealed to me. I could remember what the stuffed bird looked like—what *perceptual* experience had then given me to know. *Now* I could, at last, recognise what I *saw*, before that char's work, as a case of the instancing, by a certain object's being as it was, of a certain generality, something being a greater bittern. My powers of deduction, and memory of the stuffed bird's provenance, now allow me to conclude that there are greater bitterns in the fens.

McDowell insists (rightly) that perception must provide us with something we have the *capacity* to respond to, rationally, knowledgeably, in taking it to be so (judging, seeing) that such-and-such. This requires, he insists, that our rational capacities—those same capacities at work in 'forming the unity' of a judgement—must be at work in perception's providing us with what it does for us (thus) to respond to. There is a clue to why he insists this in one description above of the work thus done: perception must provide us with something bearing content (a viewing) to which one might attach an 'I think', and *would* thus obtain a judgement. Nothing less would allow for knowledgeable judgement. This gap between what perception must supply and the response thus permitted corresponds exactly to the gap between representing things *as being* some particular way—as might be done without endorsing their so being—and representing things *to be* that way. So, if perception *must* supply the above, that is to say that the most that could be supplied by our ability to *respond* to what we see (etc.) is what fills the space between representing-as and representing-to-be—in one vocabulary, the attaching of a force.

If such is the work our rational capacities must do for us to have something to respond to rationally, a conclusion follows about those capacities by which we are able to take the world to bear on what to think—in Frege's terms, by which we are able (rationally) to pursue the goal truth. These capacities are only able to operate on things shaped like a thought, or at least like what a thought is of, a way for things to be. They can operate only on generalities, only *within* the conceptual (at least while guiding what we judge). Thus it is that these same capacities must operate in perception itself—presumably on something else. (Though how *that* trick could then be turned remains a mystery.)

But, as Frege has shown, this could not be right. A capacity to judge *must* be, *inter alia*, a capacity to relate the conceptual to the *nonconceptual*, to recognise the instancing relation to hold between what it does. Its work *cannot* be confined *within* the conceptual. To take something to be so is to acknowledge the fundamental relation to hold between a denizen of the one realm and a denizen of the other: between things being as they are, on the one hand, and some way *for* things to be on the other. In one place in the relation, something which lacks generality, has no reach; in the other, a generality, something to be instanced. Recognition here draws on acquaintance with both domains. One needs acquaintance with the workings of the relevant generalities. One also needs acquaintance with that particular case which is to do (or not) the instancing—as one does to think at all of that which is the way things are, e.g., to think of what Elmer is now doing that *that* is snuffling. Perception's role is precisely to provide this last sort of acquaintance. Filling it with generalities would be no help.

If a capacity to judge were not sensitive to particular cases, and to how, in each, things are, it would not be a capacity to judge at all. If *we* were not sensitive *in our responses* to which particular cases were such as to count as, e.g., ones of Elmer snuffling, and which were not, we

would not have the capacity to feel, or see, any bearing of the world on the thing for us to think. Then we would not be judging at all. True enough, *logic* (what Frege called the *laws* of truth) deals only with relations within the conceptual. The instancing relation is not one of these. But if our responses to the world are to be rational—so if we are to have a capacity to judge at all—then our rational capacities must extend beyond logic's ambit. Turning McDowell's vision around, they must do so in operation in our *responses* to experience, and not just in our being provided things to respond to.

We can go a step further. One could say about the instancing relation much the same as Frege said of what he held to be the relation of an object falling under a concept: it is the *fundamental* relation to which all relations within the conceptual can be reduced. (Cf. Frege 1892-1895: 128) One does not have the conceptual in view at all, has no particular concepts in mind—and so *has* no capacity for such things as judgement—unless one has an adequate grasp on how (enough) denizens of the conceptual reach, thus unless he is able to recognise, well enough, particular cases *as* cases, or not, of enough ways there are for things to be (knows well enough what counts as what)—unless, that is, he can so exploit acquaintance with the particular cases themselves. McDowell loads what we *receive* in experience—what we get to respond to—with the content he does because he confines our rational capacities, or their work in our responses, *within* the conceptual. Frege's point is that so doing robs us of rational capacities *überhaupt*.

It also misconstrues the role of perceptual experience. Perception's role is to provide us acquaintance with terms which stand on one side of the instancing relation—that occupied by the nonconceptual. It is thus that we exercise our capacities to see (tell, recognise) what counts as what. Thus it is that Frege stresses the distinction between seeing as a perceptual accomplishment—seeing-O—and seeing as a function of thought—seeing-T. The perceptual accomplishment is (e.g., visual) acquaintance with that which is fit to operate on our sensory transducers (e.g., to form images on retinas). It is awareness of such things as the pig, an episode of snuffling, the pig snuffling, the pig standing just *there* beneath the oak.

McDowell is concerned to preserve the good idea that, sometimes, one can *just* see that a pig is snuffling. One need not infer this from, or take it on the evidence of, something *else* experienced. I see the pig, snuffling. My *reason* for taking the pig to be doing this (insofar as we can speak of reasons here) is just his doing it, or that I can *see* (hear) him snuffling. But, as stands out clearly in Frege's picture, the relation between the pig snuffling and the fact that the pig is snuffling is nothing like entailment, not a logical relation. So nor is the move from seeing the pig snuffling to seeing *that* the pig is snuffling anything like an inferential move. Such moves and relations live *within* the conceptual. They are not available for lining up those two distinct domains, the conceptual and the nonconceptual. Recognition, as when one recognises what is, in fact, the pig snuffling as a case of things being such that the pig is snuffling, is not inference, not even inference with a foot in each domain. Frege does not threaten that good idea which, as McDowell sees, must be preserved here.

If what we see does in fact instance things being such that a pig is snuffling, then just *that* which we are visually aware of is a case of a pig snuffling. But what perception affords is acquaintance with what so counts, thereby opportunity to recognise its doing so—opportunity afforded anyway, whether exploited or not. (And whether the instancing is recognisable or not, as snuffling might not be were some swine catarrh a dead ringer for it.) Again, *that* a pig is snuffling is not located in the environment. Nor is that what is going on there so counts. A

*fortiori* it is not something *perception* could supply awareness of. Nor is such perception's role. It will do for it to provide *perceptual* awareness of the pig snuffling, thereby affording awareness that the pig is snuffling to those capable of recognising, to that extent, what it is they see.

Our senses (e.g., sight) provide us with a view of things engaged in that which in fact instances all that is (visibly, audibly, etc.) instanced in (those) things being as they are—far more than we could ever recognise. We see and hear the snuffling. We thus witness what is, in fact, an historical instance of snuffling. We are not thereby presented with a view *as to* what ways for things to be are instanced by what we see. We are not presented with what we are *as* falling under given generalities. Such is not an object of visual awareness. Nor could it be the way for perception to make the world bear for us on what to think. To *recognise*, identify, the way things are as such that a pig is snuffling, we must be afforded acquaintance with that which *is* so to count, and which might or might not do so, all depending on what would count as something being a pig, and as something snuffling. (Not that our *recognising* what so counts as so counting need change the way anything looks, or looks to us. *The way* in which perception opens up the world to us is by affording acquaintance with what *falls under* generalities. Without such acquaintance we could not so much as acquiesce (rationally) in a view *as to* which ways for things to be were instanced by things before us being as they are. We would not have those things to think about at all.

Relations *within* the conceptual—ones holding between given ways for things to be and given others—cannot, on their own, fix how the conceptual relates to something else, the nonconceptual. They cannot decide how it participates in the instancing relation. They cannot fix to what particular cases anything reaches. They fix nothing unless it is already fixed, for enough of their terms, and enough particular cases, to which of these those terms would reach. The reach of the conceptual to the nonconceptual is not fixed by any structure internal to the conceptual. It is not fixed independent of that to which it reaches. Perceptual experience is experience of, affords awareness of, *just* that other side of the relation. It thereby does its job. It allows us to see *that* an oak is before us, or that a pig is snuffling, in seeing the oak, or the snuffling pig. Or it does that for those who know their oaks, or snuffling pigs, when they see (or hear) them.

Some relations within the conceptual are negotiable. Whether *oak* is a genus depends on how the world is, on what it provides so to classify. Perhaps some are non-negotiable, fixed in advance of whatever particular cases the world may dish up. So it would be on some accounts of categories: *no matter what*, something could instance a thing being an oak only if it also instanced those other ways for things to be. Someone, even if not in thrall to Kant's problem, *might* see in this work for rational capacities—capacities whose first home is in thought and judgement: in allowing (e.g.) visual awareness to provide does provide for us to respond to, these capacities would infuse it with representational content, so that in such experience things were represented as instancing at least *those* most general ways for things to be. Or it might just shape visual experience so as to make their instancing somehow easily recognisable. The uselessness of the first sort of work has already been discussed. As for the second, if there is really no such thing as objects of perceptual awareness *not* instancing these ways for things to be, then it takes no shaping to make this recognisable to one who knows that fact. If it is recognisable at all, it is recognisable no matter what the shape.

**4. Unities:** What of the first term in the slogan's comparison? Here the unity of a judgement (or thought) is meant to be formed by some 'function' out of thought-elements ('concepts'). The direction is counter to Frege's core insight that whole thoughts come first. For Frege we can make sense of the idea of a concept, and then isolate some, only in terms of the notion of a thought. As he puts it in 1882,

I do not think that the formation of concepts can precede judgements, because this presupposes an autonomous existence of concepts, but I think concepts arise through the decomposition of a judgeable content.  
(1882 (1980): 118)

We come to concepts by breaking down thoughts. A thought, for Frege, just is a question of truth, presented, not in interrogative form—the question whether (it is true that) Sid snores—but, as it were, in the form of a supposition—that Sid snores. We come to concepts in carving up a thought's task—making truth (*simpliciter*) turn in a particular way on how things are—into subtasks—making truth turn in part on such-and-such. We *have* decomposed (articulated) the thought *only* if the subtasks we identify, performed jointly, *are* the thought's whole task. There can be no question of any further factor *unifying* these subtasks into the whole task. What a concept does it does *within* a thought. We can understand what it does only in terms of that notion of truth *simpliciter* whose first application is to whole thoughts. Objects *fall under* concepts: concepts are *true of* them. No *true of* without *true full stop*.

When we carve an element out of a thought, we move from that generality intrinsic to *all* thoughts (see above) to a wider generality. We do this in a way which is moving from the generality of a thought to the generality of something not a thought—in the core case here, from a way for *things* to be (catholic reading) to a way for *a thing* to be. We thus move from a reach to one range of particular cases—say, things being such that Sid snores—to a wider class—say, things being such that *something* snores. Where this is a move to what is not a thought (here a concept) it is a move to a wider range of *thoughts*—that Sid snores, that Pia snores, etc. Moving to a concept, we thus bring the thought from which we abstract it under a given generality. The point about *true of* again: no ranges of thoughts without *thoughts*.

Decomposing the thought that Sid snores, we might thus reach a range of thoughts, each of someone that he snores, and a range, each of Sid. Think of a range as reaching to all the cases anything in it does. Thus the wider generality of the concept than of the thought from which we extract it. Conversely, so thinking, the thought that Sid snores stands at the point where these two ranges intersect. Where each element thus partially identifies the thought's reach, no further unifying work is called for.

What Frege describes is the structure of *being true*, not *holding true*. Whatever the structure of being true, it is not literally inconsistent with that to suppose the structure of holding true to require, for holding this stance—or others—towards a thought, that thought be presented to the holder (whether by himself or something in him) in a way which needs to be constructed out of other material—building blocks of some sort—by some 'unifying function'. Nor is it literally inconsistent with the structure of truth to suppose that such should be so independent of anything as to how our psychology merely happens to be, or of anything to be established by empirical enquiry. The idea of such construction is anyway rife in current

*philosophy* of psychology. McDowell's talk of the unifying function as "*operative* in the unity of judgements, in that case *actively exercised*" (italics mine) suggests that he *may* have some such thing in mind. But if, through change of topic, such is not quite *inconsistent* with Frege, it is at least hard to see, if thoughts themselves are not so structured, what could make for such a requirement, even if misleading analogies between thinking and talking might make for the appearance of one.

If McDowell, and/or Kant, is interested in some issue about the structure of *holding true*, an issue in (presumably non-empirical) psychology), what sort of interest might this be? If unifying is called for here, then there is, perhaps, a legitimate question in empirical psychology as to how, for us, the relevant mechanisms work. I think Jerry Fodor thinks of things in this way. But I doubt that either Kant or McDowell does. Between this and the structure of being true, what else is there? 'Transcendental' psychology perhaps? Kant, we are told, was much concerned with questions how things *could* be. How could a thinker, or one of us, stand towards a thought such as to judge it true? A possible answer: he, or we, could not unless we had a faculty in us which constructed such standings-towards-thoughts out of building blocks. To so much as entertain the thought that monkeys fly, say, you, or some faculty in you, would have to construct a presentation of this thought to consciousness out of smaller units.

Such a thesis about holding true is not contradicted, strictly speaking, by anything in the structure of being true. Perhaps it is suggested by thinking of judging as an episode, one of *raising*, and then answering, a question, rather than—as it usually is for Frege—a stance, or posture, towards the world—not an episode gone through, but something maintained. For postures the thesis at least cannot be transcendental. Things *need* not be like that. I will develop this through an analogy with an idea of Frege's. In 1882, Frege continued that passage about the primacy of whole thoughts thus:

I do not believe that for each judgeable content there is only one manner in which it can be decomposed, or that one of these possible manners can always claim material precedence. (1882: 118)

The idea continued throughout as central to Frege's thought (see, e.g., 1892, 1919). A *whole* thought, the idea is, is *structurable* in many different ways. Or at least this is often the case. No one such structure, he tells us, is *as such*, or for serious ('sachliche') ends, more fundamental than any other. Perhaps there is an analogy here between a thought and a thinker.

One can draw an analogy here between thoughts and judges. A thought represents the world as a certain way. A judge at a time represents the world as a certain way. For the thought, that certain way is *a* way for things to be. For the judge, it lies in his finding things as he does: in the bearing he is prepared to find in the world on what the thing for him to do, or think, would be in adopting projects, and in their execution; on how to conduct his (thinking and doing) life. There is what he is prepared to acknowledge as to when the world turns out to be as expected, when not. All this the beginning of a long story, an unfolding of the idea of a thinker holding a *picture* of the world—picturing things as he does (not necessarily equivalent to picturing things as such-and-such way there is for things to be. The analogy would be: this picture of the world, equivalently the posture thus held, is



decomposable in many different ways into thinking this, that and the other; and in different ways on different occasions and for different purposes. For one thing (to go beyond Frege for a moment), what counts as thinking that, say, Pia drinks *mojitos* on one occasion for saying what she thinks may not do so on another. This idea of a posture decomposing in many ways repays much more elaboration. But its function here is just suggestive. In any case, a posture decomposable in many ways, none with a serious claim to priority 'for *sachliche* ends', cannot be one formed by some fixed set of elements, each itself built up in a particular way from building blocks. Nor could it be that if it is decomposable (for some purposes) into, *inter alia*, thinking, say, that Pia drives a Porsche, that *that* sub-posture, entertaining, or thinking, *that* thought, need be built up out of elements if it is to make good on its claim to be a posture held.

One sign that the analogy is on the right track is our preparedness to recognise the same thought as expressible in different ways. Sid might report, 'Pia's Porsche is in the shop.' Or he might report, 'Pia's ride is being serviced.' In suitable circumstances, at least, we would recognise these as different ways of expressing the same thought. That thought, expressible in either way, could not then be built up in some one way out of given building blocks. Nor could our stances towards it, if these are such as to make either of the above equally recognisable to us as an expression of it. Nor could a picture of the world if, in these circumstances, such picture would not differ in being decomposable as containing what is expressible in one of these ways, but not what is expressible in the other.

Another reason concerns our relation to our perceptual experiences. In seeing, for example, we see, and recognise ourselves as seeing, what we do of how things are. What we thus recognise ourselves as seeing (then having seen) is, in fact, such that things, in so being, thus instantiate countless ways for things to be—more than we shall ever know of. What among these are such that in taking in, visually, what we thus do of how things are, we thus come to take things to be *that* way? For example, I see a greater bittern cross the path ahead and disappear into the brush. I am duly impressed. But I do not know what a greater bittern is, have never heard of one, could not, if asked, finger the *greater* bitterns in a lineup. The *way* I take things to be is in fact a way such that a greater bittern crossed the trail. But does this decide things? Or, again, I am in court. The defence challenges my claim to have seen a greater bittern cross the trail. Did I not really see only its hind quarters, or facing side? Am I quite sure it was not a mechanised stuffed bittern I saw? And so on. Suppose I acquiesce in the defence's suggestions. So now I revise my description of what I saw. Many are the revisions I might choose from, depending on how those suggestions impressed me. I saw an avian profile flitting across my path and dissolving in the brush, e.g. But my revised descriptions require the right provocation. I state things according to my belief, as it is and was. But do these descriptions really give the content of judgements I held all along, do they express thoughts towards which all along, thanks to some unifying function, I stood in such relation?

In any case, what I saw and took in does become part of my image of the world, how I picture it, along with all I then take to be so. It guides me in my perceptions, and choices, of the thing to do, and the thing to think, as belief does. Thus it is that I can be stating my long-held belief in giving a description I would never have thought of but for that particular form of provocation the defence indulged in. That what guides as belief does is thus formed counts, I think, against the idea that what thus guides me decomposes in any unique way into thinking that this, that and the other; so equally against the idea that the picture needs to be, or could be, built up by some unifying function out of building blocks for thoughts.

But this only gestures at a more principled discussion which I omit here. I only note that the idea of thoughts, or stances towards them, as each built in a particular way of particular blocks is the idea Diderot (the French politician of *Investigations* §366) expresses thus:

Whatever the order of terms in a language, ancient or modern, the mind of the writer has followed the didactic order of French syntax. (1751: 390)

We say things in French as the mind is forced to consider them no matter what language in which one writes. (1751: 371)

There is a particular way which is the *mind's* way of organising, structuring, thoughts. Wittgenstein mocks this view, I think, because he was once himself gripped by it. There is no evident reason to think it right.

**5. The Second Term:** If we follow Frege, no unifying function is called on to *compose* thoughts. Nor, I have suggested, is one called on to compose stances towards them. *Decomposition* is another matter. Logical relations between thoughts are structural relations. So these only appear in decomposing. If all pigs grunt entails that this one does, that can only be because of something in common to those two thoughts—what one might capture in describing both as about pigs grunting. Logic thus requires that thoughts be decomposable; grasping it, plausibly, an ability to decompose them. If it is the same function at work in thinking and seeing, perhaps, then, it is a decomposing function.

Rereading the slogan in this way gives us: the same ability to decompose thoughts which is exercised, sometimes actively, in judging must be operative in decomposing (empirical) 'Anschauungen' (for McDowell (and for seeing) viewings, or havings in view, cases of our seeing what we do) if perception is to make the world bear for us on what to think. Our seeing what we do must be decomposed for us by some such function into (*inter alia*), say, our seeing a pig beneath that oak if we are, indeed, really to *see* the pig beneath the oak; if we are to be able to exploit our experience in thereby *recognising* what we confront as things being such that a pig is beneath an oak. This seems right. What we *see* (O-see) must be such as to permit recognition of things being as they are as a case of there being a pig beneath the oak; must allow us thus to connect the nonconceptual we encounter with that bit of the conceptual. What we are given in receptivity—the nonconceptual, presented in a given way—must *permit* knowledgeable responses (*suitable* work of spontaneity).

But what kind of organising is this being supposed to require? Once again, there is that organising work studied in the psychology of perception. Visual processing so works in us that we are visually sensitive to colours, colour boundaries, edges, depth, various particular kinds of motion, and so on. When the instancing of a way for things to be is recognisable by such features, we are, so far as that goes, well placed to do the recognising (when processing goes well). The rest, if we follow Frege, is up to thought.

No processing, no seeing. Empirical psychology *has* been forthcoming about the details. But there are three things to note. First, what the relevant processing operates on is not (in general, at least) itself an object of visual awareness, not itself part of what we experience

visually. What a given such mechanism does is more like operating on, and modifying, some electrochemical signal. Second, what does the operating is, in general, not capacities for thought, but rather dedicated and more or less encapsulated, capacities to process signals of the relevant sort—e.g., to fill them in with information (or misinformation) about the location of edges in the scene before the viewer. Third, while we *can* describe what all this processing does as organising our visual experience for us (in a certain way), at least so far as the uncontentious idea is concerned all this need come to is that it affords us visual awareness of our environment (the scene before us). E.g., it allows us to be sensitive to—visually aware of—the presence of edges, so of detachable objects, at certain places in that scene. It provides (when all goes well) no *new* things for us to be *visually* aware of. Or where it does, it is not *thereby* that the world comes to bear for us as it does on what to think and do.

We must be suitably sensitive to the right features of our environment—colours, shapes and so on. But neither Kant nor McDowell is, I think, interested in the details of what enables this. Or at least that function which is meant to work both in thinking and seeing is not assigned such work. I *think* this is clear at least for Kant. First, Kant's organising function operates on the 'unbestimmte Gegenstand' (undetermined, or indeterminate object) of an empirical *Anschauung*—on what Kant calls an *appearance* ('Erscheinung'). But the object of an (empirical) *Anschauung* is what one *views* in a viewing/having in view. It is thus, unlike the signals on which visual processing works, itself an object of (e.g.) *visual* awareness. Second, the functions operating in visual processing are not at work in organising thought. They are dedicated, encapsulated (more or less).

As to the third point, I leave it open whether what we are meant to be offered *visual* awareness of when Kant's function has done its work is any more, or other than, those objects beyond our skin which provoked *Sinnlichkeit* in the first place; whether what we are thus provided to witness, thus to recognise as instancing the being of *ways* they visibly are, is any other than those extradermal *Sinnlichkeit*-provokers, or any other than that of which we judge, sometimes knowledgeably. With a modifier before it, e.g., 'empirically', a 'Yes' should be read as 'No'.) If the answer is unqualifiedly yes, then it is for *empirical* psychology to identify the work done—doubtfully the study Kant had in mind.

For McDowell, the objects of our visual awareness are to be none other than what is before our eyes, those very *Sinnlichkeit*-provokers. His organising function is to provide no additional objects of *visual* awareness. He still sees organising work as needed, so that those provokers can be presented to us *as* instantings of such-and-such generalities, as what count as cases of things being thus and so. Were they not so presented, the idea is, we could not *recognise* them as—*knowingly* take them to be—what they thus are.

Frege shows why *this* cannot be right. For one thing, what we have in view on an occasion instances, in being as it is, *many* more ways for things to be than we could ever get in mind. For many more than *we* could entertain, it does so visibly, recognisably to a thinker equipped to recognise their instantings. It is not as if what we *see* would differ, or as of things would be *visually* presented to us differently, were the ways whose instantings we could recognise other than they are. It is just that which we do see, and to which we are visually sensitive which instances far more than we will ever know. For Frege, no one way of decomposing a thought can claim priority over another for serious purposes. No one way is most fundamental. Similarly here none of the ways whose instantings we witness in our viewings of things can claim priority as a way the experiencing itself represents things as being

(though our particular visual equipment may make it easier to pick out the instantings of some of these ways than of others).

**5. Images:** In A120 Kant speaks of an ‘active power of synthesising multiplicities’ (in an ‘appearance’), which he calls the ‘Einbildungskraft’—power to imagine, or to form images. Of this he says,

The Einbildungskraft must bring the multiplicity of an [empirical] intuition (‘Anschauung’) into an image (‘Bild’).

There need be nothing wrong with this idea. But there are various understandings of it. There is, first, the question whether a *Bild* here is an object of *sensory* awareness, like the image of U. S. Grant now in my wallet, or of thought, or some mixture of these, or neither. Second there is the question whether *Bilder* are to be things presented to us for us to respond to, or rather themselves responses to something else, or, again, a bit of both, or neither. Third, there is the question how, if at all, these *Bilder* articulate—into things of propositional form—particular ways for things to be—or as the pictorial (a painting, say) articulates, or as the way I remember Burgos looking might articulate, or, again, a mixture of these, or none of them. And are such images articulable exhaustively? Fourth, how is *forming* out of other elements to be understood? Is the image formed *of* them, so that they are part of it? Or are these transformed, or mapped, into elements of some other sort? Finally, are these *Bilder* that of which we judge? Or do they bear for us in some other way on what the thing to judge would be?

We have learned by trying that certain answers to these questions will not do. For example, relevant to Kant’s concerns, these images had better not be that *of* which we judge. They had better be, if *images* at all, then images of something other than themselves, where it is *this* of which we judge. To hold otherwise would be a thoroughly virulent form of idealism. If we needed to learn this, then it is one thing Frege taught us. Equally, for familiar reasons, those images had better not be our access to that of which we judge. In that role, they would rather cut us off from the possibility of judging of this.

McDowell posits work of rational capacities in our being presented perceptually with what we are. I think that work can be seen, neutrally, as the formation of images. Such certainly need not be objects of visual awareness. It is not that he posits some *such* objects other than those before our eyes. As he rightly insists, it is precisely that pig snuffling which, when seen, can be reason (our reason) to take a pig to be snuffling. But suppose the images here are organised, provided, *for* us on the presentation, rather than the response, side of experiencing. And suppose they are not objects of visual awareness. We are *given* them to respond to, perhaps to incorporate into the way *we* picture things. Here Frege has another lesson for us. Perception, in supplying such images, would be doing work it is not perception’s job to do. Rather than merely affording acquaintance with that which is to be recognised as instancing a way for things to be or not, perception would prejudice issues for us. Such would not help make the world bear for us on what to think. It would merely be telling us what we need to see for ourselves. It would be, if anything, mere distraction. Such images as McDowell

has in mind—*contentful* intuitions—might harmlessly, even fruitfully, occur on the response side of the divide. But he insists that this is precisely not were he means to finds them.